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Frequent Shopper programs are becoming ubiquitous in retailing. Retailers
seem unsure however about whether these programs are leading to higher
loyalty, or to higher proﬁts. In this paper we analyze data from a US super-
market chain that has used a number of frequent shopper rewards to improve
sales and proﬁtability. We ﬁnd that while these programs are proﬁtable, this
is only because substantial incremental sales to casual shoppers (cherry pick-
ers) oﬀset subsidies to already loyal customers. In this way our ﬁndings are
inconsistent with existing theories about how frequent shopper programs are
supposed to work. We construct our own Hotelling-like model that explic-
itly models cherry picking behavior and show that its predictions match the
data quite closely. We further test the predictions of our model by char-
acterizing the impact of such programs on trip frequency and basket size.
We then use the model to examine more complex scenarios. For example,
our analysis suggests that frequent shopper programs may be unproﬁtable
if they eliminate all cherry picking. This may explain why some retailers
seem dissatisﬁed with their programs. We end by proposing a solution that
retains the beneﬁts of the frequent shopper programs and yet continues to
let supermarkets beneﬁt from price discrimination.
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Ever since the acclaimed success of Frequent Flyer Programs in the airline
industry, companies in many retail sectors such as hotels, ﬁnancial services,
and grocery, have rushed to introduce “frequent shopper programs.” These
programs oﬀer various incentives and rewards to consumers on the basis of
cumulative purchases from a given provider, be it a store, a service, or a
manufacturer. The simplest frequent shopper program is perhaps a volume
discount as in the case of the Discover card where one gets 2% of spending
as cash back at the end of the year. More elaborate programs include tiered
reward structures backed by a combination of a sort of volume discount (a
free ticket for every 25,000 miles), a variety of services and a plethora of
direct mail oﬀers with varying degrees of customization.
These programs are expensive to launch and maintain. According to Nick
Agarwal, a spokesperson for Asda, U.K., “it cost us 8 million [pounds] per
year just to run the loyalty card trial and would have cost 60 million to roll out
nationally (Curtis, Oct 7, 1999).” More recently, Starwood Hotels and Re-
sorts Worldwide Inc. launched an aggressive frequent-guest program backed
by a $50 million advertising campaign (The Wall Street Journal, February 2,
1999). One of the most sophisticated programs of this type is being used in
the casino industry with Harrah’s investing more than $100 million in com-
puters and software to develop and implement a “frequent bettor program.”
The “Total Rewards” Program launched in 1997 was recently modiﬁed to
include gold, platinum and diamond thresholds for frequent gamblers.
While it is diﬃcult to document the economic value of these programs, The
Wall Street Journal (May 5, 2000) reports that “the results are impressive
enough that other casinos are copying some of Harrah’s more discernible
methods. Wall Street analysts are also beginning to see Harrah’s - long a
dowdy also-ran in the ﬂashy casino business - as gaining an edge on its ri-
vals. Harrah’s stock price has risen quickly in recent weeks as investors have
received news of the marketing results. And the company’s earnings have
more than doubled in the past year.” According to Gary Loveman, Harrah’s
COO, “gamblers are promiscuous - we have customers who play around with
everybody,” and therefore the idea behind the reward program is to “grow
the business by getting more from Harrah’s existing casinos and customer
1
3 Bell and Lal: The Impact of Frequent Shopper Programs in Grocery Retailing
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012base” (The New York Times, December 27, 1999).
In the theoretical literature, success of these frequent shopper programs is
argued to be due to reduced price competition through the creation of switch-
ing costs (Klemperer 1987). The argument is that as consumers continue to
dedicate an increasing share of their wallet in the category to one brand or to
one store, they incur a cost to switch to a diﬀerent store or brand because of
inertia eﬀects. Since in many sectors consumers subscribe to several frequent
shopper programs and regularly buy more than one brand, one may surmise
that these inertia eﬀects may not be signiﬁcant enough to result in proﬁtable
loyalty programs. Fortunately, these results are shown to persist even with
endogenous switching costs as in Caminal and Matutes (1990) and Kim, Shi
and Srinivasan (2000) where consumers are awarded a cash discount for re-
peat purchases. In a model where ﬁrms compete over two periods and some
consumers (heavy buyers) buy in both periods while others (light buyers) buy
in only one period, it is shown that a cash coupon for purchasing in both pe-
riods reduces price competition in the second period leading to higher overall
proﬁtability. The cash coupon provides an incentive to the heavy buyers to
remain loyal in the second period and therefore acts as a switching cost to
the consumers. In contrast, the results in Kopalle, et al. (1999) suggest that
“reward programs can be viewed as powerful, multi-period price promotions.”
Success of loyalty programs can also be argued on the basis of the work by
Heskett, Sasser and Schlesinger (1997) who document the value of focusing
attention on the most loyal customer. They argue that as customer reten-
tion costs are generally lower than customer acquisition costs, companies
are better oﬀ focusing attention on their more loyal customers especially
since the top 20% of customers account for 80% of revenues and often more
than 100% of proﬁts. Brian Woolf (1996), based on his experience with loy-
alty/frequent shopper programs, makes two claims: (i) Retailers should not
focus on getting new customers but on retaining and reaﬃrming the loyalty
of the most proﬁtable existing ones, and (ii) Retailers should use the in-
formation available through frequent shopper cards to determine their most
proﬁtable customers and charge them lower prices, through special oﬀers or
targeted coupons, while their less proﬁtable customers should have to pay
full price. This will, he argues, cause the more proﬁtable customers to in-
crease the amount of money they spend with the retailer, thus increasing
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“... programs must enhance the overall value of the product and service and
motivate loyal buyers to make their next purchase.
In summary, there are at least two competing reasons for the success of fre-
quent shopper programs: (a) reduced price competition and therefore higher
proﬁts due to switching costs, and (b) reduced marketing expenses by focus-
ing attention on retaining the loyal customers and capturing an increasing
share of their wallet.
Few studies shed light on the eﬀectiveness of frequent shopper programs.
Dowling and Uncles (1997) conclude that “given the popularity of loyalty
programs, they are surprisingly ineﬀective.” Sharp and Sharp (1997) studied
the impact of the Fly Buys, Australia’s largest consumer loyalty program cov-
ering more than 20 percent of Australian retail spending and enrolling almost
25% of Australians. Consumers gathered points at participating retailers and
redeemed them for ﬂights and accommodation. Based on transaction data
from a consumer panel, the authors conclude that only “two of the six loy-
alty program participants showed substantial excess loyalty deviation,” but
such deviations were also observed for non-members of the loyalty program.
The authors conclude that they ﬁnd no evidence to support an increased
penetration or purchase frequency resulting from the incentive eﬀects. A
second study investigated the proﬁtability of Tesco’s loyalty program using
data on market share and share of category requirements during 1994, 1996,
and 1997, and concluded that “on the evidence available, there has been lit-
tle impact on the share loyalty of individual customers so far” (East, Hogg
and Lomax 1998). Hence the veracity of the theoretical arguments presented
above is yet to be documented.
The only direct evidence in support of frequent shopper programs is available
in Dreze and Hoch (1998) who experimented with a Baby Bucks program for
a period of six months at all 70 locations of ABCO Markets in Phoenix and
Tucson, AZ. The program, backed by radio and TV commercials, window
banners, both in-aisle overhead banners and shelf talkers, oﬀered consumers
Baby Bucks that could be redeemed for a $10 store-wide gift certiﬁcate after
spending $100 during an earn period in the “baby products” category. The
program yielded a 25% increase in category sales, transaction size on baby
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products rose by 25% while store traﬃc increased by only 5%.
In this paper we investigate the eﬀectiveness of frequent shopper programs
in grocery retailing. Grocery retailing is one of the least proﬁtable sectors
of the economy with net margins of 1-2% and the competition for shoppers
is ﬁerce. There aren’t many ways to diﬀerentiate grocery stores. Weekly
ﬂiers in any given geographical area, based on the same vendor supported
trade promotions, are also unable to create a point of diﬀerence in the eyes
of the consumer. Not surprisingly, grocery shoppers have become well known
for their promiscuity, with most shopping at more than one store regularly.
Even more importantly, these shoppers are known to split their weekly gro-
cery baskets across several competing formats. Given the success of frequent
ﬂyer programs in an environment where one airline is perceived to be no
diﬀerent than another, the grocery industry has moved to adopt the frequent
shopper program as a panacea for its misfortunes.
Many frequent shopper programs deliver discounts at the check-out and al-
low shoppers to earn a rebate for buying a targeted amount of groceries
within a well deﬁned period. As the latest craze in the grocery industry,
61% of retailers had or planned to have a frequent shopper program, ac-
cording to a Food Marketing Institute survey (The Commerial Appeal, May
17,1998). More recently, Retail Advertising and Marketing Association In-
ternational reported that the average household participating in any frequent
shopper program has 3.2 cards (Shepherdson, Feb 2000). Sixty-six percent
of U.S. households belong to at least one grocery frequent shopper program
and 57% belong to two. However, the success of these loyalty programs in
the grocery industry is unclear (Kramer, Sept 15, 2000). Kramer contends
that even though Grocery Manufacturers of America’s most recent report
on the subject argues that “leveraging consumer data is critically important
to the future of the grocery industry, on the basis of Kraft’s and Procter &
Gamble’s experience at Wegmans, Wegmans is the exception rather than the
rule. Most frequent shopper programs are really frequency programs that
use discounts to sway consumer loyalty. This short term approach eventu-
ally becomes just a sophisticated form of matchable price competition. Most
card programs are oﬀered to shoppers indiscriminately and deliver incentives
across the board, regardless of shopper value.” In this paper we provide the
4
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shopper programs on household shopping behavior in grocery retailing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we ana-
lyze frequent shopper data that have been made available to us by a grocery
chain. We ﬁnd that while the program achieved its objective of increasing
spending by its best customers, more surprisingly, we ﬁnd that the increase
in spending by customers in lower spending deciles is even greater than that
by its best customers. In contrast, the redemption of the rewards is the high-
est among the higher spending deciles. The chain makes incremental proﬁts
from the frequent shopper programs despite the programs’ lack of proﬁtabil-
ity with the best customers.
In section 3 we construct a model whose predictions match our empirical
ﬁndings. Our Hotelling-like one-period model explicitly allows for consumers
to cherry-pick between competing stores. It predicts that frequent shopper
programs improve proﬁtability when one of the competing stores oﬀers a pro-
gram. Our model shows that the increase in proﬁts stems from the reduction
in shopping costs motivated by the rewards of the frequent shopper program.
These system wide savings are reﬂected in higher proﬁts to the stores and
better prices to consumers who increasingly shop for the basket at a single
store. We use data on trip frquency and basket size to provide empirical
support for our theoretical model.
In section 4, we extend our model of frequent shopper programs in two ways.
First, we demonstrate that frequent shopper programs continue to be prof-
itable even when the competing store oﬀers a frequent shopper program.
Second, we consider situations where stores sell to consumers with varying
shopping costs. We show that frequent shopper programs can reduce prof-
itability by denying stores the opportunity to price discriminate between
customers. In this more realistic setting we discover how and why frequent
shopper programs can be a money sink for competing stores.
We conclude with a discussion of our results and directions for future re-
search.
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We have been provided frequent shopper program data by a supermarket
chain in the mid-west U.S.A. that prefers to be anonymous. The chain has
a dominant share of its market. The clientele of this chain tends to be more
upscale, older, more educated, with higher income and a smaller family. The
only major source of competition is from Albertsons which did not have a
loyalty card. The chain has had a card program since late 1995 and has used
it to provide a variety of beneﬁts to its card customers in the form of clipless
coupons, item discounts, video rentals, rewards for loyalty, surprise rewards
and automatic contest entries. By 1998, the chain had about 200,000 house-
holds in the program with about the top 20% of customers accounting for
80% of sales. Almost 90% of sales and 70% of transactions were reported to
be swiped through the card.
During 1998 and 1999 the chain implemented a series of reward programs
to increase sales to its best customers. In 1998 the chain introduced three
diﬀerent kinds of frequent shopper programs. The ﬁrst, around Easter, was a
ham promotion where consumers who spent $475 or more in the store during
a six-week earn period received a certiﬁcate for a whole ham to be redeemed
during a ﬁve-week period around Easter. Those spending between $325 -
$474 received a certiﬁcate for a half ham. A second frequent shopper reward
program was run during another six-week period during April-May with the
redemption period set for the month of June. In this program, consumers
had to spend $600 or more to get a certiﬁcate for a 15% discount coupon
for a single purchase, a 10% discount coupon was awarded to those spending
between $450 - $599 and a 5% discount coupon was mailed to those spending
between $150 - $449. The ﬁnal frequent shopper program of the year was
implemented for a period of eight weeks starting soon after Labor Day and
ending before Thanksgiving. Customers spending more than $815 got a cer-
tiﬁcate for a Butterball turkey plus a 15% discount coupon to be redeemed
over the following four-week period. Customers spending between $625 -
$815 received a certiﬁcate for a Butterball turkey, and consumers spending
between $485 - $624 received a certiﬁcate for a Little Butterball turkey.
In 1999, the supermarket chain did not run a ham promotion but improved
the terms of the 5/10/15% discount to 10/15/20%. This frequent shopper
6
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1999, with the redemption period set for the month of June. In this program,
consumers had to spend $600 or more to get a certiﬁcate for a 20% discount
coupon for a single purchase, a 15% discount coupon was awarded to those
spending between $400 - $599 and a 10% discount to those spending between
$200 - $399. The chain also ran an improved turkey promotion in 1999 by
decreasing the required spending levels to qualify for a discount coupon. Cus-
tomers spending more than $750 over a six-week period earned a certiﬁcate
for a Butterball turkey plus a 15% discount coupon to be redeemed over a
three-week period. Customers spending between $500 - $749 received a cer-
tiﬁcate for a Butterball turkey, and consumers spending between $250 - $499
received a certiﬁcate for a Little Butterball turkey.
2.1 Analysis of the Ham Program
As indicated earlier, the objective of the ham program was to increase sales
to the best customers (as articulated by Woolf 1996) and consequently the
proﬁtability of the stores. To analyze the impact of the ham program and
estimate the diﬀerential impact on the best customers (high spenders) and
the worst customers (low spenders), household spending data are available
to us for the following time periods: a pre-ham promotion period, denoted
as P1, lasting from Jan 1 - Feb 7, 1998; the ham promotion period, denoted
as P2, during Feb 8 - March 21, 1998; and the redemption period, denoted
as P3, of March 22 - April 18, 1998. We also have data for the corresponding
three periods in 1999 when no such ham program was oﬀered. The available
data can be summarized as shown in Table 1 with the six diﬀerent periods
identiﬁed as P1-P6. Moreover, we know that all those who qualiﬁed to receive
a reward by spending more than $325 during the earn period were mailed a
reward to be redeemed during P3. All households who redeemed the award
are also identiﬁed in our data set.
In order to estimate the impact of the Ham program on the best and worst
customers, our approach is to look at a pool of best customers (deﬁned later)
and estimate the change in spending levels during the ham promotion period
as compared to a control condition. The control condition provides an esti-
mate of the spending level that could be expected of them in the absence of
7
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redeemed the reward versus those who did not redeem the reward to iden-
tify the impact of the program. This analysis is based on the presumption
that consumers who are not interested in the program or do not pay atten-
tion to the program, do not change their shopping behavior and therefore
do not redeem the reward even if they qualify. In contrast, consumers who
pay attention to the program are also likely to redeem the reward. Hence,
a comparison of the changes in spending levels during the ham promotion
period across these two groups of consumers provides an estimate of the im-
pact of the ham program. Similar estimates for the low spenders provide us
the variance in the impact of the program across the consumer population.
We recognize that there may be some customers who paid attention to the
frequent shopper program but could not redeem the reward for other extra-
neous reasons or some who had not heard of the program until they received
a coupon in the mail. Such possibilities are likely to result in our estimates
of the impact of the program to be conservative.1
1More precisely, we hypothesize that if a consumer is involved in the program, the









where Sj are all the households that are involved in the frequent shopper program and
therefore pay attention and respond to it; Sk are all the households that are not involved
in the program, pay no attention to it and therefore are not aﬀected by it. However, we
have no indication of a household’s level of involvement in our data set. We only observe




control + Eﬀect of the Program ∗ β + error, and
Sm
did not redeem = Sm
control + Eﬀect of the Program ∗ α + error,
where β captures the impact of consumers who redeemed the award but did not hear
about it and α captures the fact that some consumers might have been aﬀected by the
program but did not redeem the reward for some extraneous reasons. Thus the diﬀerence
between those who redeemed the reward and those who did not redeem the reward provides
a conservative estimate of the impact of the frequent shopper program.
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can be assessed by comparing the household purchases during ham promo-
tion period with those in a control condition, the pre-ham-promotion period,
Jan 1- Feb 7, 1998.
To classify customers as best customers versus worst customers, we use the
cut-oﬀs in the ham promotion program to form natural categories. The ham
program rewarded all those spending $475 or more during the promotion
period with a coupon for a full ham, those spending between $325 and less
than $475 with a coupon for half ham and, those spending less than $325
were not rewarded. We therefore categorized all those who were expected to
spend $475 or more as the best customers, all those who were expected to
spend between $325 and less than $475 as better customers and the rest
were classiﬁed as worst. We used spending levels (S1) in the pre-ham pro-
motion period in 1998 (P1) to estimate the expected spending levels during
the ham promotion period and classiﬁed consumers as best, better and worst.
We can now estimate the impact of the Ham promotion program by regressing
the dependent variable, spending level during the ham promotion period (P2)
minus the spending level in the pre-ham promotion period (P1)(normalized
for the same number of days), S2-S1, on the following 6 independent variables
with no constant term in the regression equation. The independent variables
in the regression equation are indicator variables for the following categories:
(a) Best customers who redeemed the reward
(b) Best customers who did not redeem/get the reward
(c) Better customers who redeemed the reward
(d) Better customers who did not redeem/get the reward
(e) Worst customers who redeemed the reward
(f) Worst customers who did not redeem/get the reward
Null-Hypothesis: If the Ham Program does not have an impact on shop-
ping behavior of those who redeemed the reward, there should be no diﬀer-
ence in the dependent variable between consumers who redeemed the reward
and those who did not redeem/get the reward, for any of the three groups of
customers (best, better and worst).
9
11 Bell and Lal: The Impact of Frequent Shopper Programs in Grocery Retailing
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012The results of this regression analysis are presented in Table 2. These results
indicate that while diﬀerence in spending between customers who redeemed
the reward and those who did not redeem the reward among the best cus-
tomers was $98.02, the corresponding diﬀerence among the better and worst
customers was much higher, $140.98 and $150.55, respectively. We therefore
reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the frequent shopper program
had an impact on shopping behavior. Moreover, we observe that the impact
of the program is not the highest among the best customers. It is the bet-
ter customers and worst customers who seem to respond more to the Ham
promotion as compared to the best customers. These diﬀerences across the
best, better and worst customers are even more salient when one takes into
account the fact that the expected average spending of the best customers
was $641 while the expected average spending for the better customers was
only $387. With average expected spending for all others to be $172, we
can conclude that the Ham promotion had the biggest impact in percentage
terms on the worst customers and the least impact on the best customers:
contradicting the dictates of Woolf (1996).
We also observe that 5941 of the “best” customers redeemed the reward,
yielding a redemption rate of 69.7 %. Redemption rates among the “better”
and “worst” customers were signiﬁcantly lower at 42.0% and 12.4%, respec-
tively. Clearly, the “worst” customer group consists of consumers who were
not expected to qualify for the reward and therefore the low redemption rates
are not surprising. However, as also reported in Table 2, these diﬀerences in
redemption rates continue to hold even when we reduce the sample to only
those consumers who qualiﬁed to receive the reward due to their spending
in period 2. Thus we notice that while the impact of the Ham promotion
program is the least among the best customers, the redemption rate is the
highest among this group.
We are informed by the grocery chain that the average cost of goods sold
is about 75% and that the retail value of full ham and half ham was $25
and $15, respectively. The data show that 5941 consumers increased their
spending by $98.02, 2454 consumers increased their spending by $140.98 and
2170 consumers by $150.55. Moreover, while 4461 consumers redeemed half
a ham, 6104 consumers redeemed a full ham. Therefore we can calculate the
proﬁtability of the program to be 5941*$98.02*0.25 + 2454*$140.98*0.25 +
10
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31,789 consumers, before overhead costs.
To summarize, our analysis allows us to conclude that:
(i) The ham program had the least impact on the shopping behavior of the
best customers.
(ii) The percentage of customers redeeming the reward is the highest among
the best customers.
(iii) The program was proﬁtable not because of the impact on the shopping
behavior of the best customers but instead most of the proﬁtability was due
to the impact on the behavior of all but the best customers.
Before accepting these results at their face value we recognize that there may
be some concerns about our estimates. First we need to consider the pos-
sibility of a stockpiling eﬀect. It is well known that promotions often lead
consumers to buy more in the promotion period, only to purchase less in
future periods thereby creating the well known post-promotion dip. We need
to look at sales in the redemption period and check if they were adversely
aﬀected by the purchasing behavior during the ham promotion period. To
investigate this issue, we use (S3- S6), sales in redemption period in 1998
(P3) minus the sales in the corresponding period in 1999 (P6) (when no
ham promotion was oﬀered). (S3-S6) should be negative in the presence of
a stockpiling eﬀect. Therefore, the diﬀerence between the estimate of (S3-
S6) for those who redeemed the coupon and those who did not redeem the
coupon should also be negative in presence of the stockpiling eﬀect. The
results of the regression analysis with (S3-S6) as the dependent variable and
the six indicator variables used before as the independent variables are pre-
sented in Table 3. Consumers were classiﬁed as best, better and worst on
the basis of their spending levels (S1)in the pre-ham-promotion period (P1).
The regression results show that the diﬀerence between those who redeemed
the coupon and those who did not redeem the coupon continues to remain
positive and signiﬁcant. This implies that the ham promotion actually had
a carry-over eﬀect rather than suﬀering from a stockpiling eﬀect. We also
ran a similar regression with (S2+S3) - (S5+S6) as the dependent variable.
(S2+S3) are the purchases during and after the ham promotion period in
1998 and (S5+S6) are purchases in the corresponding periods in 1999. If a
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who redeemed the coupon and those who did not redeem the coupon to dis-
appear. However, our results indicate that the diﬀerence for the three groups
remain signiﬁcant and again are the lowest for the best customers as a per-
cent of average expected spending.
A second concern relates to possible seasonality in the data, sales closer to
Easter are generally higher than those at the beginning of the year, for ex-
ample. We therefore re-analyze the data controlling for seasonality. We use
data in Feb 8 - March 21, 1999 as the control condition because the ham
program was not oﬀered in 1999. While the comparison between purchases
during Feb 8 - March 21, 1998 (Ham Promotion) and Feb 8 - March 21,
1999 (No Ham Promotion) controls for seasonality, these diﬀerences may be
aﬀected by year-to-year trends due to inﬂation or natural changes in family
consumption patterns. To control for possible year-to-year trends, we use
the diﬀerence in sales in Periods 1 (Jan 1-Feb 7, 1998) and 4 (Jan 1-Feb 7,
1999) identiﬁed in Table 1. Therefore the impact of the Ham Program can
be measured as (S2-S5) - (S1-S4). We use spending levels in the pre-ham
promotion period in 1998 (P1) to estimate the expected spending levels and
classify consumers as best, better and worst. Using the same independent
variables as used before, the regression analysis yielded the results presented
in Table 4. The results of this regression show that among consumers who
were expected to spend $475 or more (best customers), the diﬀerence in con-
sumer spending between those who redeemed the coupon and those who did
not was $94.46, during the ham promotion period. Similarly, among con-
sumers who were expected to spend between $325 and less than $475 (better
customers), the corresponding diﬀerence was $138.59; and ﬁnally for those
expected to spend less than $325 (worst), the diﬀerence was $144.03. Thus
the basic ﬁndings reported earlier remain unaﬀected by potential seasonality
and trends in the data.
A third concern relates to the possibility of mis-classiﬁcation of a consumer
given our use of spending levels in the pre-ham promotion period in 1998.
In other words, a consumer spending slightly more than $475 is classiﬁed as
being among the best customers but could actually have been among the
better consumers. The spending level used for classiﬁcation is equal to a
true value plus an error term. Some consumers who are classiﬁed as the
12
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sumers who are classiﬁed as better consumers may actually be among the
best consumers. A similar possibility exists among the better and the worst
consumers. The question arises if this error in classiﬁcation creates biases
that do not allow us to conclude that the impact of the program is the least
for the best customers and the most for the worst customers. To address
this concern, we conducted a sensitivity analysis on the cut-oﬀ values used
to classify consumers to be among the best, better and worst. For example,
when we used a cut-oﬀ of $500 and $350 in lieu of $475 and $325 to assign
consumers into the three groups: best, better and worst, the diﬀerence in the
spending levels between consumers who redeemed the coupon and those who
did not, remain unchanged. Table 5a presents the results of this sensitivity
analysis using diﬀerent cut-oﬀ values with the dependent variable as S2-S1.
We also addressed this issue by taking an extreme step of using only those
consumers who actually spent more than $325 during the ham promotion
period and therefore qualiﬁed to receive a coupon for half or full ham. With
S2-S1 as the dependent variable, we ﬁnd that among those who were expected
to spend more than $475 during the promotion period (best customers), the
diﬀerence in spending between those who redeemed and did not redeem was
$46.64. The corresponding diﬀerence among the better and worst customers
was $59.85 and $71.20 respectively. Thus even among those who qualiﬁed
and received the coupon, the program was the least eﬀective among the best
customers.
We addressed the issue of mis-classiﬁcation in two other ways. First we inves-
tigated the impact of mis-classiﬁcation on spending levels in 1999, when no
ham promotion was oﬀered. If our results are eﬀetced by mis-classiﬁcation,
these results should persist even when no ham promotion is oﬀered. There-
fore we use a dependent variable, S5-S4, spending in 1999 during the period
corresponding to the ham promotion period in 1998 minus spending in 1999
during the period corresponding to the pre-ham promotion period in 1998.
The independent variables are the same as those in Table 2. To make a con-
sistent comparison, we focused only on the qualifying households, i.e., those
spending more than $325 in P5. Each of these households was categorized
into one of the six groups based on their spending levels in the pre-ham-
promotion period in 1999 (P4), and assigned randomly to have redeemed
13
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all households that were expected to spend $475 or more in P5 (based on
their spending in P4) were randomly assigned to redeem the reward with a
probability of 0.742, as reported in Table 2. Similarly, all households that
were expected to spend more than $325 but less than $475 in P5 (based on
their spending in P4) were randomly assigned to redeem the reward with a
probability of 0.593, as reported in Table 2. in In eﬀect, we have tried to
repeat the statistical procedure that was used to analyze the 1998 data, on
the 1999 data (when no ham promotion was oﬀered). Table 5b presents the
results of this regression and shows that, there is no statistical diﬀerence
between the spending levels of redeemers and non-redeemers for
any of the three customer groups. We therefore reject the hypothesis
that our results in 1998 are due to classiﬁcation biases induced by our sta-
tistical analysis. Second, we ran a regression on change in spending level
due to the ham promotion period, as measured by S2-S5, on spending in
P1, whether a household redeemed a reward and the interaction between the
two aforementioned variables. The regression results as shown in Table 5c
indicate signiﬁcant aﬀects for each of the three independent variables and in
particular have a negative sign for the interaction variable; again conﬁrming
the ﬁnding that the impact of the program is higher at lower levels of spend-
ing.
In summary, after checking for potential stockpiling eﬀects, seasonality and
trends, and the possibility of mis-classiﬁcation of customers, we conclude
that
(i) the best consumers responded the least to the ham promotion
(ii) the best customers are most likely to redeem the reward
(iii) overall the ham program was proﬁtable (before overheads).
2.2 Analysis of the Discount and Turkey Program
In analyzing the impact of the 5/10/15% discount program in 1998, and the
10/15/20% program in 1999, we again used the spending in the discount pro-
gram period minus the spending in the previous period, in the same year, as
the dependent variable. However, since there are more categories of spend-
ing levels than in the ham program, the dependent variable was regressed
14
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the diﬀerences in spending levels of the redeemers and non-redeemers among
the diﬀerent categories for both 1998 and 1999. Table 6a also presents the
redemption rates, deﬁned by the number of redeemers divided by the number
of households in the category. We see that the basic pattern in these results
is exactly as observed in the ham program. The best customers are least
responsive to the program, as a percentage of their spending levels, but have
the highest redemption rates. Finally, using an analysis similar to that re-
ported for the discount programs, the turkey promotion yielded results that
are reported in Table 6b; again reconﬁrming the pattern of eﬀects seen in
the other programs.
A summary of the eﬀects of these programs is available in Table 7. They
show three systematic eﬀects:
(a) These programs have the greatest impact on the behavior of the lower
decile customers rather than the best customers.
(b) The percentage of customers redeeming the reward is highest among
those consumers whose behavior is changing the least.
(c) The chain loses money on the best customers because a higher frac-
tion redeem the reward without changing their buying behavior signiﬁcantly.
However, a lower redemption rate among the worst consumers along with a
much higher increase in spending leads to higher proﬁtability for the chain.
These frequent shopper programs are proﬁtable in the aggregate.
3 An Explanation
Our empirical research suggests that supermarket frequent shopper pro-
grams, as currently implemented, are an attempt to get customers to spend
more at a store in exchange for a discount - be it a ham, turkey or a discount.
In this section we seek to oﬀer an explanation for the impact of such pro-
grams; where it is proﬁtable to oﬀer a frequent shopper program if only one
of the competing ﬁrms oﬀers the program and that such programs inﬂuence
15
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store) more than that of the best customers. Our modeling eﬀort builds on
the work of Lal and Matutes (1994) and Lal and Rao (1997) that models
competition between two stores where consumers shop for a basket of goods.
Our analysis assumes that two supermarkets, A and B, located at the end
of a line of unit length, carry the same assortment of products as reﬂected
in a typical basket of goods purchased by shoppers, but perhaps at diﬀerent
prices. For the sake of expositional simplicity, the marginal costs of the goods
to the stores are assumed to be zero.
Consumers are located uniformly along the line connecting the two stores
and incur a shopping cost c, to and fro, per unit distance. This parameter
is often interpreted as the travel cost to a store but more generally as the
parameter that captures the degree of diﬀerentiation between stores. The
latter interpretation involves c as the cost associated with the distance be-
tween the consumer’s ideal point and the location of the store in a perceptual
space, where the line connecting the two stores is a vector along dimensions
diﬀerentiating the two stores. Each consumer is assumed to buy the same
assortment of goods on a regular basis and the store choice decision is deter-
mined by the prices of the products and the relative convenience of the two
stores. Consumers have a reservation price v for each good, and choose not
to buy if the item is not available at a price below the reservation price. All
prices are known to consumers before making the store choice decision.
As mentioned above, stores carry the same assortment of goods but may price
individual items diﬀerently. As a practical matter it is diﬃcult to implement
a pricing strategy in which there are no cherry picking opportunities for the
dedicated shopper. With thousands of items in the grocery store there will
always be some items that are attractive to cherry pickers. The set of all
items in each store can be divided into two baskets: one that consists of
items that are relatively cheaper in the store and the other of those items
that are relatively cheaper in the other store. The price of the basket that is
cheaper in store A is assumed to be Pa−d and the price of the basket of goods
that is more expensive in store A is assumed to be Pa; similarly, the prices
at store B are Pb − d and Pb for these two baskets respectively. We further
assume that the discount d on the cheaper items in the store is exogenously
determined by factors beyond the control of the store and therefore, stores set
16
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captured by the decision variables Pa and Pb respectively. Since, all prices
are known to the consumers, the cherry picker therefore can pay 2Pa − d by
shopping for all items at store A or pay Pa +Pb −2d by cherry picking. Our
model therefore has two key parameters that capture the trade oﬀ faced by
the cherry picker: c, the opportunity cost of shopping around, and d, the
savings potential.
3.1 Analysis of The Pure Price Game
For benchmark purposes, we begin by ignoring discounts and setting d = 0.
In this case there is no incentive for any customer to cherry pick and every
consumer shops either at store A, or store B, but not both. The marginal
customer is located at a distance x from store A where
2Pa + 2cx = 2Pb + 2c(1 − x)
that is x =
c + Pb − Pa
2c
.
Assuming that the reservation price is suﬃciently high to cover the price of
the goods and the shopping costs, store A’s proﬁts are
2Pax = Pa




and are maximized when Pa = 0.5(c+Pb). By optimizing 2Pb(1−x) or simply
by recognizing the symmetry between A and B we deduce that P ∗
a = P ∗
b = c.
Total proﬁts to store A are 2xPa = c. Note that the proﬁts to the stores are
related to travel costs rather than the value added of the items.
These results are well established but serve as a benchmark for our later
analyses.
17
19 Bell and Lal: The Impact of Frequent Shopper Programs in Grocery Retailing
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 20123.2 The Case of Promotional Pricing
If d > 0, consumers that are located closer to store A are likely to purchase
the basket at store A and this fraction is
xa =
(










buy the complete assortment from store B. All con-
sumers located between xa and xb cherry pick and buy the lower priced good
at each store. Such cherry pickers exist only if xb > xa, i.e., d > c, that
is the discounts have to be large enough (compared to the shopping costs)
to make cherry picking worthwhile. If the discounts are too large, everyone
cherry picks; i.e., xa < 0 and xb > 1. In equilibrium this happens if d = 2c,
and discounts are large enough to cover the total costs of shopping around
for all consumers.
We conclude that promotions d induce
(i) no cherry picking if d ≤ c,
(ii) some cherry picking if 2c ≥ d ≥ c.
We know that store proﬁtability is equal to c in case (i). What about the
other case ? In case (ii), store A will wish to maximize
(2Pa−d)xa+(Pa−d)(xb−xa) = (2Pa−d)
2c + Pb − d − Pa
2c
+(Pa−d){d/c−1}.














Knowing that a symmetric equilibrium dictates P ∗
a = P ∗
b we see that the









b = c + 0.5d.
The equilibrium proﬁts therefore are c − 0.5d(d/c − 1) which is less than c
for all d > c, and are zero when d = 2c.
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As the results in Section 2 are for a mid-west supermarket chain that is the
only competitor in its trading area to oﬀer a frequent shopper program, we
begin by assuming that only one store, store A, oﬀers a loyalty program. This
store oﬀers a discount of L to all consumers who buy both goods at store
A, otherwise, the regular price at store A is Pa and the discounted price is
Pa − d. The proﬁts to store A, if some consumers continue to cherry pick,
which requires c + 0.5L < d < 2c, are:
Πa = (2Pa − d − L)
(
Pb − Pa − d + L + 2c
2c
)
+ (Pa − d)
(















−4Pa + 2L + 2c + 2Pb + d
2c
.
Setting the ﬁrst order conditions to zero and solving, we get
Pa = d + 0.5Pb, and L = 1.5d − c.
At the optimal value of L there is no cherry picking because 2d−2c−L < 0
when L = 1.5d−c, and d < 2c. The proﬁts to the stores are c, and are higher
than in the case where no store oﬀers a frequent shopper program.2 These
results are consistent with the empirical results presented in Section 2 where
frequent shopper programs are observed to have increased proﬁtability. Our
model suggests that the increase in proﬁtability results from the reduction in
the welfare loss incurred due to cherry picking. This welfare loss is recovered
through the frequent shopper program and part of it goes to the store in
the form of increased proﬁtability. Moreover, since the fraction of consumers
shopping for a single item is reduced from 2d−2c
2c to 2d−2c−L
2c , it is easily seen
2In case of no cherry picking, the market share of store A is x where x is such that
2Pa−d−L+2cx = 2Pb−d+2c(1−x). The proﬁts to store A therefore are (2Pa−d−L)∗x
and those to store B are (2Pb−d)(1−x). Let 2Pa−d−L = Ya and 2Pb−d = Yb. The proﬁts
to store A can rewritten as Ya ∗ x and those to store B as Yb ∗ (1 − x) and x = 2c−Ya+Yb
4c .
Now it easily seen that in equilibrium Ya = Yb and the proﬁts to the two stores are c.
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ket at the store. This contrasts with the behavior of loyal customers which
remains unaﬀected.
To summarize, we conclude from our model that:
(a) the frequent shopper programs are proﬁtable even when only one retailer
oﬀers such a program;
(b) they are proﬁtable because they help reduce cherry picking and the re-
duction in systemwide shopping costs show up in the form of higher proﬁts,
and
(c) the frequent shopper programs impact the behavior of the cherry pickers
more than that of the loyal customers.
3.4 Empirical Validity of our Model
Assuming that frequent shopper programs do not aﬀect the total number of
trips made by a households to grocery stores, we are able to empirically test
the conclusions of our model by estimating the diﬀerence in the number of
trips for the redeemers and non-redeemers across the three customer groups.
Given our contention that frequent shopper programs impact the behavior
of cherry pickers more than that of the loyal customers by inducing them
to shop more at the store, we expect to observe the impact of the program
to be the highest for the worst customers. Table 8a presents the results of
a regression analysis where the dependent variable, T2-T1, is the diﬀerence
in the number of trips during the ham promotion period and the pre-ham
promotion period. As expected, the diﬀerence between the redeemers and
non-redeemers is the highest among the worst customers; during the ham
promotion period, among the worst customers, the redeemers made 1.7 trips
more than the non-redeemers (compared to an average of 5.8 trips for the
worst customers during the ham promotion period). Similarly, among the
best customers, the redeemers made 1.2 trips more than the non-redeemers
but the average number of trips for the best customers was approximately
10 trips during this period. The average number of trips for the better cus-
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Another test of our model could be with respect to the basket size measured
as the spending per trip. Our model predicts that the introduction of the
frequent shopper program would lead to more consumers buying the basket
rather than the single item. We should therefore expect the diﬀerence in
basket size for the redeemers and non-redeemers to be higher for the worst
customers. Table 8b presents the results of such an analysis and shows that
while the diﬀerence between the redeemers and non-redeemers in the average
basket size for the best customers was $5.67, the corresponding diﬀerence for
the better and worst customers was $7.56 and $9.33, respectively. Hence
the model predictions are again supported by our data. These results ﬁnd
further support in the analysis of the discount program, see Table 8c, where
the impact of the program on trip frequency and basket size for the worst
customers is again more than it is for the best customers.
While our theoretical model therefore provides an explanation for the em-
pirical results presented in Section 2, our experience from talking to retailers
that have implemented frequent shopper programs suggests that few think
they have enhanced proﬁtability: some customers may indeed be more loyal
in the sense of buying a greater percentage of their food items at a single
store; but the fruits of this loyalty have yet to ﬁnd their way to the bottom
line. Retailers we have talked to that have so far resisted the introduction of
loyalty programs, express satisfaction at this mixed bag performance, since it
relieves them of the burden - and potential distraction - of introducing their
own loyalty/frequent shopper program.
As we contrast our empirical ﬁndings that paint a positive picture on the
success of frequent shopper programs with the anecdotal evidence suggesting
the lack of enthusiasm for these programs among leading retailers, we note
two diﬀerences between the circumstances for our mid-western chain and
these leading retailers. First, as mentioned earlier, the mid-western chain,
unlike many supermarket chains, does not face competing loyalty programs.
Second, while our model assumes homogeneity (every customer has the same
travel costs), supermarkets attract consumers with diﬀerent shopping costs.
In the next section we therefore extend our analysis to investigate the impact
of these factors on our theoretical results. These extensions will allow us to
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4 Extending the Model
4.1 Competing Loyalty Programs
We now extend our analysis to the case where both stores oﬀer a frequent
shopper program. Suppose stores A and B oﬀer loyalty payments of La and
Lb to customers who buy both baskets at their store. Cherry pickers don’t
receive this payment of course. All consumers located to the left of ya buy
the complete assortment from store A where ya is such that
2Pa−d−La+2cya = Pa−d+Pb−d+2c, or ya =
(




Similarly, all consumers located to the right of yb buy the complete assortment
at store B where yb is such that
2Pb−d−Lb+2c(1−yb) = Pa−d+Pb−d+2c, or yb =
(




Assuming that some consumers continue to cherry pick, store A would max-
imize (2Pa − d − La)ya + (Pa − d)(yb − ya). Optimizing with respect to Pa
and La yields P ∗
a = 2c/3+d and L∗
a = d−2c/3 and similarly for P ∗
b and L∗
b.
These values lead to y∗
a = 2/3 and y∗
b = 1/3. Since y∗
a > y∗
b, we conclude that
oﬀering these loyalty programs eliminates all cherry picking. Any solution
with the property P ∗
a − L∗
a = c + d/2 and L∗
a ≥ d is therefore optimal. With
the elimination of cherry picking, store A0s proﬁts are as before. The solution
P ∗
a = c + d,L∗
a = d means that the two baskets are priced at c + d and c
respectively with a loyalty payment of d, for a total payment of 2c and proﬁts
of c. Thus we ﬁnd that if loyalty programs are oﬀered by both stores they do
not enhance the proﬁtability of the stores compared to the case when only
one store oﬀers a loyalty program.
4.2 The Case of Two Customer Segments
We will now repeat the analysis of Section 4 assuming that there are two
kinds of customers, with shopping costs c1 and c2 respectively where c2 < c1.
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bers of each type, each distributed uniformly between the stores. To keep
the proﬁtability ﬁgures comparable with our earlier results, we assume that
the total number of customers is unchanged. As in the previous section, we
have a number of cases to consider to determine the equilibrium prices and
proﬁtability to the stores.
First consider the case d < c2. In this case no cherry picking takes place and
there are two breakeven distances to calculate, x1 and x2 where, for example,
2Pa + 2c1x1 = 2Pb + 2c1(1 − x1), and store A will pick Pa to maximize




a = 2c1c2/(c1 + c2)
with a proﬁt of 2c1c2/(c1 + c2).
Next consider the case c2 < d < 2c2 < c1. If d is in this range, some of the






b = 2c1c2/(c1 + c2) + d/2
with store proﬁts of 2c1c2/(c1 + c2) − d(d/c2 − 1)/4.
If 2c2 < d < c1, all of the c2 customers cherry pick, but none of the c1 cus-
tomers do so. The proﬁts to store A are (2Pa−d)(c1+Pb−Pa)/2c1+(Pa−d)
and the equilibrium prices are P ∗
a = P ∗
b = 2c1 + d/2 with store proﬁts of
2c1 − d/4.
Finally, when c1 < d < 2c1, even some of the c1 customers cherry pick. The
optimal price remains P ∗
a = P ∗
b = 2c1+d/2 but store proﬁts are 2c1−d2/4c1.
Figure 1 shows a graph of store proﬁts as a function of d. The highest store
proﬁts occur when d = 2c2. In other words, store proﬁts are maximized when
one segment of consumers cherry picks between the two stores.
The intuition for this graph is as follows. So long as d < c2, no customer
cherry picks therefore proﬁts are constant for all d ≤ c2. When d exceeds
c2, some customers with lower shopping cost begin to cherry pick resulting
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all customers with lower shopping costs are cherry picking. When d > 2c2,
proﬁts increase substantially but then decline for the same reason as before
(losses from cherry picking). The key question that remains to be answered
is why proﬁts increase so substantially when d > 2c2. The answer is that with
d ≤ 2c2, some cherry pickers remain in play as potential full basket shoppers
and hence inﬂuence full basket prices. However, when d > 2c2, all consumers
with shopping costs equal to c2 will never buy both baskets at either store;
as a result the full basket prices are inﬂuenced only by the price sensitivity
of the remaining high shopping cost customers.
We now consider the impact of competing loyalty programs on the shop-
ping behavior of the two segments of customers in our model. As before, we
can show that optimal loyalty programs eliminate cherry picking by setting
the reward for buying both baskets at the same store to be at or above d.
When 2c2 > d > c2, these optimal loyalty programs increase proﬁts to the
stores because eliminating cherry picking restores proﬁts to the same level as
when d = 0 (see Figure 1). However, when d > 2c2, these loyalty programs
decrease proﬁts because proﬁts when d = 0 are lower. Thus we see that
introducing competing loyalty programs do not always result in higher proﬁts.
The latest evidence to support the lack of performance comes from the UK
with the scrapping of the pilot program by Asda in August 1999 and that
by Safeway in May 2000. The experience at Safeway is summarized by its
communications director, “Loyalty is not synonymous with having a loyalty
card. Since we scrapped our ABC card we have gone on gaining customers-
one million more have come to us the past year. You can give them a point
for every penny spent, but it doesn’t buy you loyalty.” Similarly, the Asda
spokesman said that given the high costs of implementing these programs,
“we decided we didn’t have to invest in points and plastic to make our cus-
tomers loyal.” Our results are also consistent with the sentiments expressed
by Kramer (2000), where he concludes that “ ... most frequent shopper pro-
grams are really frequency programs that use discounts to sway consumer
loyalty. This short term approach eventually becomes just a sophisticated
form of matchable price competition....”
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The current thinking on frequent shopper programs is that they should be
designed to dig deeper into the pockets of the best customers. Our data from
a supermarket chain tells a diﬀerent story. The frequent shopper programs
implemented by the supermarket chain we studied aﬀected the behavior of
lower spending customers more than that of its best customers. Moreover,
these programs were proﬁtable despite the fact that the best customers were
more likely to redeem the reward without signiﬁcant change in their behavior.
These empirical results are not surprising considering that cherry picking is,
on the face of it, a bad thing. Customers travel more than is strictly nec-
essary; stores sell only low margin items to these customers. It would seem
that a loyalty program that encourages shoppers to buy all of their goods at
a single store can be beneﬁcial to all.
We construct a model of competition among stores that highlights the role
of the cherry picker. We capture the essence of their behavior through two
parameters: shopping costs (c) and the potential savings from cherry picking
(d). The analysis of our model makes predictions that are consistent with our
empirical ﬁndings. Furthermore, we provide empirical support for our model
by developing and testing two new hypotheses with respect to trip frequency
and basket size. Extending the model to allow for the existence of customers
with varying shopping costs shows that frequent shopper programs reduce
cherry picking may actually reduce proﬁtability. This is because price pro-
motions add value by providing a way for supermarkets to price segment the
market - low prices to the price sensitive, high (not so low) prices to the price
insensitive. The problem with discount-based frequent shopper programs is
that they are fairly costly and oﬀer the same deals to all, thus removing the
hidden beneﬁt of price segmentation. This may explain why grocery retailers
seem largely dissatisﬁed with frequent shopper programs.
How can frequent shopper programs be successful in the grocery industry?
First of all a frequent shopper program cannot be oﬀered indiscriminately.
It makes little sense to provide the person who lives next to the supermarket
with a discount for loyalty. Yet it would be a pity to lose any of one’s 100
best customers for the sake of a few dollars - companies often give discounts
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stores. The secret seems to be to continue to oﬀer promotions for the price
sensitive cherry picker and value added services for the full basket, less price
sensitive shopper. Retailers can also draw a lesson from the success of loy-
alty programs in the airline industry. Airlines reward their best customers
through improved perks and services rather than better prices and discounts
even when the cost of oﬀering a free trip is very low.
Supermarkets need to ﬁnd ways to reward desirable customers with non-price
beneﬁts. The loyalty card data should be used to identify the best customers,
learn what they like and dislike so that the store can do more of what they
want. An enthusiastic store manager may merchandise the store in response
to remarks and desires of the average customer or worse - the cherry picker
with time on his/her hands to converse with the store manager. Albert Lee of
Lees Supermarket reports being shocked when his loyalty data revealed who
were his 10 best customers. “I could have named only three of them,” he said.
A ﬁnal word needs to be added about the ability of such programs to mod-
ify consumer behavior. These awards should be targeted towards consumers
who have the potential to modify their behavior in a way that is desirable
to the franchise. In diﬀerent industries, diﬀerent type of customers may
have the ﬂexibility to change their behavior in response to frequent shopper
programs. For example, in the airline industry, it is the frequent traveller,
business customer, who might have the possibility to increase its patronage
of one airline over the other. The infrequent traveller who often takes only
two family vacations a year may not have much ﬂexibility in choice of airlines
and may take a long time to accumulate the miles for free trips. Hence, it
is easier to induce behavior modiﬁcation among the more frequent traveller
than the infrequent traveller. Frequent reward programs should therefore be
directed towards the business customers and rewards have to be designed
so as to encourage such customers to modify their behavior such that they
are beneﬁcial to the airline. In contrast, in the grocery industry, the best
customer may already be patronizing the store to a degree that it is diﬃcult
to increase the store’s share of wallet. It may therefore be diﬃcult to signiﬁ-
cantly change his/her behavior through a frequent shopper program. Hence
rewards to frequent shoppers have to be either lucrative enough to change
the behavior of such customers or need to be targeted at a diﬀerent customer
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Jan 1 - Feb 7 Feb 8 - March 21 March 22 - April 18
1998 P1-control P2-Ham Promotion P3-redemption
1999 P4-control P5-control P6-control
Table 1
The Ham Program in 1998
Dependent Variable: S2-S1
Variable Coeﬃcient St. Error t Stat R-NR Redemption Redemption
(among qualiﬁed)
475 R -35.9 1.78 -20.2 $98 69.7% 74.2%
475 NR -133.9 2.7 -49.7
325 R 75.9 2.77 27.4 $141 42.0% 59.3%
325 NR -65.1 2.36 -27.6
Other R 172.6 2.94 58.7 $150.5 12.4% 49.4%
Other NR 22.1 1.11 19.9
Table 2
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Dependent Variable: S3-S6
Variable Coeﬃcient St. Error t Stat R-NR
475 R 49.9 1.9 26.3 $57.70
475 NR -7.8 2.9 -2.7
325 R 31.6 2.9 10.7 $42
325 NR -10.4 2.5 -4.1
Other R 18.4 3.1 5.9 $29.90
Other NR -11.5 1.2 -9.7
Table 3
Checking for Seasonality and Trends
Dependent Variable: (S2-S5) - (S1-S4)
Variable Coeﬃcient St. Error t Stat R-NR
475 R -24.76 2.63 -9.42 $94.46
475 NR -119.22 3.99 -29.9
325 R 75.02 4.09 18.33 $138.59
325 NR -63.57 3.49 -18.2
Other R 156.64 4.35 36 $144.03
Other NR 12.61 1.64 7.69
Table 4
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Dependent Variable: S2-S1
Diﬀerence in Spending Levels of Redeemers and Non-Redeemers
Cut-oﬀ Cut-oﬀ Cut-oﬀ Cut-oﬀ Actually Spent
500 and 350 475 and 325 450 and 300 425 and 275 325 or more
Best $96.34 $98.02 $98.49 $98.35 $46.64
Better $139.85 $140.98 $144.01 $148.27 $59.85




Variable Coeﬃcient St. Error t Stat R-NR
475 R -42.32 2.19 -19.3 $3.0
475 NR -39.32 3.5 -11.2
325 R 83.12 3.65 22.8 -$1.94
325 NR 85.06 4.26 20
Other R 208.4 4.33 48.1 -$5.03
Other NR 213.43 4.32 49.4
Table 5b
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Dependent Variable: S2-S5
Variable Coeﬃcient St. Error t Stat
intercept -37.11 2.07 -17.9
Redeem indicator 83.03 4.59 18.08
Spend in P1 0.037 0.007 5.25
Interaction -0.06 0.01 -5.78
Table 5c
Results from Discount Programs
1998 Discounts R-NR Redemption 1999 Discounts R-NR Redemption
600 R $57.19 68.66% 600 R $93.11 72.92%
600 NR 600 NR
450 R $80.66 57.47% 400 R $124.67 58.66%
450 NR 400 NR
150 R $72.19 37.42% 200 R $138.68 39.52%
150 NR 200 NR
Other R $101.42 13.69% Other R $182.76 16.96%
Other NR Other NR
Table 6a
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1999 Turkey R-NR Redemption
750 R $143.81 82.72%
750 NR
500 R $145.74 61.59%
500 NR
250 R $121.10 34.24%
250 NR
Other R $107.69 13.47%
Other NR
Table 6b
Summary of Our Results
Ham Program R-NR Redemption 1998 Discounts R-NR Redemption
475 $98 69.70% 600 $57.19 68.66%
325 $141 42.00% 450 $80.66 57.47%
Other $151 12.40% 150 $72.19 37.43%
Other $101.42 13.69%
1999 Turkey R-NR Redemption 1999 Discounts R-NR Redemption
750 $143.81 82.72% 600 $93.11 72.92%
500 $145.74 61.59% 400 $124.67 58.66%
250 $121.10 34.24% 200 $138.68 39.52%
Other $107.69 13.47% Other $182.76 16.96%
Table 7
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Diﬀerences in Trips between Redeemers and Non-Redeemers
Variable Coeﬃcient t Stat R-NR
475 R -0.1 -3.7 1.2
475 NR -1.3 -21.3
325 R 0.9 14.3 1.6
325 NR -0.7 -14.5
Other R 2.2 34.8 1.7
Other NR 0.5 21.7
Table 8a
Results from Ham Programs
Diﬀerences in Basket Size between Redeemers and Non-Redeemers
Variable Coeﬃcient t Stat R-NR
475 R -3.21 -11.4 $5.67
475 NR -8.88 -20.7
325 R 1.67 3.8 $7.56
325 NR -5.89 -15.7
Other R 9.66 20.7 $9.33
Other NR 0.33 1.87
Table 8b
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Diﬀerences in Trips and Basket Size between Redeemers and Non-Redeemers
1998 Discounts R-NR 1999 Discounts R-NR
Trips Basket Size Trips Basket Size
600 0.88 $0.66 600 1.08 $5.14
450 0.95 $3.15 400 1.51 $8.42
150 1.22 $3.71 200 1.84 $7.45
Other 1.4 $9.21 Other 2.18 $15.56
Table 8c
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